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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Gloria Martineau appeals from the September 26, 
2001, Order issued by the Honorable Kay L. Mclff of the Sixth Judi-
cial District Court, Sanpete County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction 
for the Utah Supreme Court to decide this appeal exists under 
Art. VIII, §§ 3 and 5, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996), because the district court's Order is 
a final ruling that determines all of the issues in the case. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues in this appeal are: 
1. Did the district court err in ruling that the 7-year 
period for adverse possession under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, 
et seq., does not apply to a statutory claim of adverse possession 
of a claimed easement and, thus, in denying defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and in granting plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment? This question presents an issue of law that is reviewed 
for correctness. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 
1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 
455 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved below. (See R 84-85, 
94-100, 198-206.) 
2. Did the district court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment when the undisputed facts showed over 30 years 
of adverse use or, in the alternative, when genuine issues of mate-
rial fact exist concerning whether adverse use continued for over 
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20 years? This issue involves a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 
(Utah 1993). This issue was preserved below. (See R 84-36, 98-
100, 204-206.) 
3. Did the district court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact exist 
concerning whether plaintiff had abandoned his claimed easement? 
This issue raises a question of law and is to be reviewed for 
correctness. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 
(Utah 1993). This issue was preserved below. (See R 84-85, 95-96, 
206-208.) 
III. DETERMINATIVE AND CENTRALLY IMPORTANT AUTHORITY 
Utah's adverse possession statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7, 
-8, -9 and -12 (1953), is determinative and of central importance 
with respect to the adverse possession issue presented in this 
appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case. Plaintiff claims an easement by neces-
sity across a portion of defendant's property located in Sanpete 
County, Utah. (R 2-4. J1 Defendant maintains that the easement 
defendant does not deny that, many years ago, there was a 
unity of title between plaintiff's property and defendant's prop-
erty, and that an access way once existed across the eastern bound-
ary of defendant's property for purposes of ingress and egress to 
and from plaintiff's property. (See R 50.) 
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claimed by plaintiff was abandoned in the late 1930s or early 1940s 
and that, in any event, was lost through adverse possession which 
continued throughout the period from at least the mid-1960s to the 
present time. (R 84-102, 198-229.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint 
in this action on August 4, 1997, long after the statutory 7-year 
period for adverse possession had run against him and his prede-
cessors-in-interest. (See R 1.) 
B. Proceedings Below. By its Order entered on September 26, 
2001, the district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment and denied defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
(R 288-295.) The court ruled that (a) plaintiff and his prede-
cessors -in- interest did not abandon the claimed easement, and 
(b) defendant did not adversely possess the easement claimed by 
plaintiff because (i) the 20-year period for a prescriptive ease-
ment applies to adverse possession of an easement, rather than the 
7-year statutory period for adverse possession, and (ii) defen-
dant's adverse possession only occurred over a period of 15 years, 
rather than the required 20 years. (R 293-294.) In making its 
ruling, the district court ignored undisputed facts and misapplied 
the law. Defendant timely filed her notice of appeal from the 
Order on October 26, 2001. (R 299.) 
C. Statement of Facts. In 1986, plaintiff acquired a one-
acre parcel of property located in Sanpete County, Utah ("Plain-
tiff's Property"). (R 219, 1 28.) Defendant's 20-acre parcel 
("Defendant's Property") adjoins Plaintiff's Property on the north, 
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west and south. (R 103.) Defendant purchased her property in 
1992. (R 217, 219, 11 21, 28.) A county road runs east and west 
along the northern boundary of Defendant's Property. (Id.) 
Up until the late 1930s or early 1940s, the owners of Plain-
tiff's Property apparently used an access way along the eastern 
edge of Defendant's Property to reach the house on Plaintiff's 
Property. (R 66-68.) At some point in the late 1930s or early 
1940s, the Andersons, the then owners of Plaintiff's Property, 
moved from that property. From that point on, no one lived in the 
house on Plaintiff's Property, nor did anyone maintain the house or 
use the property. (R 214, 217, 11 7 and 17.) Following the move, 
long-time residents of the area understood that Plaintiff's Prop-
erty had been abandoned. (R 214-215, 1 8.) Over the years, the 
house began to deteriorate and crumble to a point where animals 
began to use the house for shelter and, even plaintiff later ack-
nowledged in correspondence that the house had been "abandoned." 
(R 214-215, 1 8.) Also, a huge rock pile has existed on the south 
side of the old house from at least the mid-1960s until the present 
time, taking up a very large portion of Plaintiff's Property and 
making that portion unusable. (R 214-215, 1 8.) 
Defendant's predecessors, the Nortons, purchased Defendant's 
Property in the mid-1960s. (R 213, 1 4.) From the time of their 
purchase, the Nortons maintained a fence across the entire northern 
boundary of Defendant's Property adjacent to the county road and 
across the eastern portion of Defendant's Property on which plain-
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tiff now claims he has an easement. (R 217-218, 1 19.) Since 
the Andersons moved from Plaintiff's Property in the late 1930s or 
early 1940s, no one, except for the Nortons and people who were 
working for the Nortons, used the eastern portion of Defendant's 
Property. (R 215, 1 9.) Beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing 
until the time the Nortons sold Defendant's Property to defendant, 
the Nortons used the entire property to graze animals almost 100% 
of the time. (R 215, 1 9.) 
When the Nortons purchased Defendant's Property in the mid-
1960s, cows were living in the dilapidated house on Plaintiff's 
Property. (R 215, % 11.) It had no doors or windows at the time 
and has continued to deteriorate from the mid-1960s until the 
present time. (R 215, H 11.) Also, when the Nortons purchased 
Defendant's Property, it showed no evidence of an easement across 
the eastern portion of the property to the old house on Plaintiff's 
Property. (R 216, 1 12.) The Nortons used the entire 20-acre 
field comprising Defendant's Property continuously from the time 
they purchased the property until they sold it to defendant. (Id.) 
From the mid-1960s until 1992, no vehicles drove over the 
portion of Defendant's Property claimed by plaintiff as an ease-
ment, and the Nortons maintained a fence along the south side of 
the county road and never permitted anyone to use any portion of 
Defendant's Property as an easement or otherwise. (R 216, 1 13.) 
The fence was closed and wired shut at all times so no one could 
use Defendant's Property as an easement, as claimed by plaintiff. 
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(Id.) Cleon Rigby, a long-time resident of the area, never saw 
anyone pull back the fence along the county road or gain access 
through the fence to Plaintiff's Property. (R 215, 1 10.) 
Once or twice a year, the Nortons pulled the fence back from 
the corner near the northeast end of Defendant's Property, on which 
plaintiff claims an easement existed, to let their cattle and 
horses in and out of their field. (R 216, H 14.) Except when the 
Nortons pulled the fence back for that purpose, they kept the fence 
closed at all times to contain their animals which they kept in the 
field, (Id.) The Nortons never permitted an opening to exist in 
the fence for an access easement to Plaintiff's Property, and at no 
time did they permit anyone to gain access across their property 
to the old house on Plaintiff's Property. (R 217, H 15.) 
At all times from the mid-1960s until they sold Defendant's 
Property to defendant, the Nortons treated the full 20 acres as 
their property and paid taxes on the entire property, including 
the portion plaintiff now claims as an easement. (R 217, 1 16.) 
During that entire time, it was obvious to the Nortons that Plain-
tiff's Property had long since been abandoned. (R 217, K 17.) 
No one ever attempted to remodel the house, construct any improve-
ments on Plaintiff's Property, or use that property. (Id.) 
During the period from the mid-1960s until 1992, the Nortons 
also plowed the entire 20-acre field on Defendant's Property, 
including the portion where plaintiff claims an easement existed, 
and planted grass on the property up to the east fence. (R 217, 
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1 18.) At all relevant times, the Nortons also continuously used 
Defendant's Property as pasture for their animals, again including 
the portion claimed by plaintiff as an easement. (R 217-218, 
1 19.) The Nortons were the exclusive users of the entire 20-acre 
parcel. (Id.) 
At one point in the early 1980s, Mr. Norton observed a lady 
walking on the eastern portion of Defendant's Property. (R 213, 
1 4.) When Mr. Norton approached her, she identified herself as 
Mrs. Mower. (Id.) Mr. Norton talked to her and told her that she 
could not trespass on and cross Defendant's Property. It belonged 
to the Nortons. (Id.) When she stated that she had a right to 
gain access to the old house on Plaintiff's Property, Mr. Norton 
informed her that she could not do so, that she would have to find 
access elsewhere, and that she would have to get a court order 
before trespassing again. (Id.) Mr. Norton then put a lock on 
the fence to keep her or anyone else from pulling the fence back 
and to ensure that no one would cross the east end of the Norton 
property to get to the old house. (Id.) He had earlier put up 
"No Trespassing11 signs on the fence along the county road. (Id.) 
Approximately 15 years passed between the time of Mr. Norton's 
conversation with Mrs. Mower and the time plaintiff filed his 
Complaint in the present action. (See R 1.) 
Since the time of defendant's purchase of Defendant's Property 
in 1992, defendant continuously and exclusively used her property 
for pasture for animals and for other ordinary uses in connection 
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with her farming operations. (R 218, 1 23.) That property was 
enclosed at all times by a wire and wood post fence which was 
capable of containing livestock. (Id.) Defendant never permitted 
anyone to use any portion of her property at any time. (Xd.) 
Shortly after defendant purchased Defendant's Property, she 
removed a portion of the fence in the northeast corner of her prop-
erty and installed a metal gate with a lock so that only her family 
could access her property at that point. (Id.; R 218-219, H 24.) 
At no time since the purchase did defendant permit anyone to gain 
access across her property to the old house on Plaintiff's Prop-
erty. (R 219, 1 25.) At all times, she intended to prevent anyone 
from crossing her property and did not leave the gate open at any 
time. (Id.) She also treated Defendant's Property in its emtirety 
as her property and paid the taxes on the entire property, includ-
ing the portion plaintiff claims as an easement. (R 219, 1 26.) 
Defendant purchased Defendant's Property under the terms of 
a warranty deed. (R 219, 1 28.) None of the deeds in the chain of 
title to Plaintiff's Property or to Defendant's Property show any 
reference to the easement claimed by plaintiff in this action. 
(R 220, 1 29.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Utah's Adverse Possession Statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-12-7, et seq. (1953), is specific and unambiguous. It only 
requires a showing of adverse possession for 7 years in order to 
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acquire title by adverse possession. Defendant presented un-
disputed facts showing that she and her predecessors adversely 
possessed the easement claimed by plaintiff for a period far ex-
ceeding the statutory 7 years. The district court, however, ruled 
that the 7-year statutory period does not apply to adverse posses-
sion of an easement and that the common law period of 20 years for 
a prescriptive easement governs. The court erred in these rulings 
and should not have granted summary judgment in plaintiff's favor. 
B. The district court also erred in granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, even assuming the 20-year period for 
a prescriptive easement applies to a statutory claim of adverse 
possession of an easement. The undisputed facts show that adverse 
use continued for over 30 years. To the extent plaintiff can show 
that he presented facts to the contrary, genuine issues of material 
fact exist, thus precluding summary judgment. 
C. The district court further erred in concluding, as a 
matter of law, that the easement claimed by plaintiff had not been 
abandoned. The undisputed facts presented by defendant showed that 
even plaintiff acknowledged that the old, dilapidated home on his 
property had been "abandoned." Also, over a period of at least 
30 years, he and his predecessors permitted defendant and her pred-
ecessors to build a fence blocking the claimed easement, to put up 
"No Trespassing" signs on the fence, to plow and plant grass over 
the claimed easement, to graze cattle on all of Defendant's Prop-
erty, and to deprive all parties from accessing Plaintiff's Prop-
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erty across the claimed easement. These facts demonstrate the 
intent required to show abandonment. At the very least, they 
create disputed fact issues that require a trial. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
A. The District Court Erred In Ruling That The 7-Year Period 
For Adverse Possession Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7, 
Et Seq. (1953). Does Not Apply To A Statutory Claim Of 
Adverse Possession Of The Claimed Easement, In Denying 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, And In Granting 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1953) provides: 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those 
under whom he claims, entered into possession of the 
property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, 
founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a 
conveyance of the property in question . . . and that there 
has been a continued occupation and possession of the 
property included in such instrument . . . for seven years, 
the property so included is deemed to have been held 
adversely. . . . [Emphasis added.] 
Section 78-12-9 defines what constitutes adverse possession under 
a written instrument: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse posses-
sion by any person claiming a title founded upon a 
written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the 
following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a sub-
stantial inclosure. 
(3) Where, although not enclosed, it has been 
used for . . . the purpose of husbandry, or for 
pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
Under Section 78-12-12, a party claiming adverse possession must 
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show "that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period 
of 7 years continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and 
grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law." 
As shown by the undisputed facts summarized above, each of the 
requirements to establish adverse possession has been satisfied. 
Defendant acquired Defendant's Property by a written instrument 
within the meaning of Section 78-12-8. (R 219, 1 28.) Defendant 
and her predecessors also paid all property taxes as required by 
Section 78-12-12. (R 217, 219, 11 16 and 26.) There is no dis-
pute that during the 15-year period from Mr. Norton's conversation 
with Mrs. Mower in approximately 1982 until plaintiff filed his 
complaint on July 31, 1997, there was continued adverse occupation 
and possession of Defendant's Property by the Nortons and defen-
dant. Even plaintiff and the district court concluded that when 
Mr. Norton refused to permit Mrs. Mower to enter Defendant's Prop-
erty in 1982, this encounter was sufficient to start the period 
of adverse possession to run. (R 205-206, 289, 293-294.) 
During this 15-year period, plaintiff also acknowledged, 
by failing to present any contrary facts, that (a) Defendant's 
Property was protected by a substantial inclosure or fence to 
contain defendant's and the Nortons' farm animals (R 218, 1 19), 
and (b) that all of Defendant's Property was also used continuously 
for the purpose of husbandry and for pasturage and the ordinary use 
of the Nortons and defendant. (See R 215-219, 11 9, 12, 14, 16, 
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18, 19, 23 and 26.) Based upon these undisputed facts and as a 
matter of law, plaintiff's claimed easement has therefore been 
extinguished by adverse possession under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, 
-9 and -12. The period of adverse use in the form of continuous 
cultivation, protection of Defendant's Property by a "substantial 
inclosure," and use of the property "for the purpose of husbandry, 
or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant" extended 
continuously over a period in excess of 7 years. 
By sidestepping the express 7-year statutory period of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-8, the district court incorrectly applied the 
20-year, common law period for acquiring a prescriptive easement. 
(See R 292-294.) To support its position, the court stated that 
"[t]he early Utah case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227 [26 
P. 291] (Utah 1891), flatly states: 'This statute [Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-12-8 and -12] does not apply to rights of way or any other 
class of easement by prescription.'" (R 292-294.) 
The district court's application of that statement in Harkness 
to the present case, however, is based on a misreading of Harkness. 
In Harkness. the plaintiff sought to invoke the adverse posses-
sion statute, with its applicable 7-year period of adverse use, to 
obtain a prescriptive easement across defendant's property. Hark-
ness, 26 P. at 292. In rejecting use of the statute in that way, 
the Utah territorial Court noted that uninterrupted possession for 
20 years is required for a prescriptive easement and the 7-year 
statute does not apply. (See id.) The Court stated that "unless 
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it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for 
a period of 7 years continuously," "in no case shall adverse pos-
session be considered established." (Id.)2 The Court went on to 
observe: 
The statute does not, in effect, presume a grant and 
give the person relying upon it the title from seven 
years7 possession alone. The presumption is made from 
the fact that the land was held adversely; and to make 
the holding adverse the land must have been protected by 
a substantial inclosure, or it must have been usually 
cultivated or improved. . . . [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 293. 
In addition, the Court emphasized that "occupation and claim 
must have been continuous for the 7 years, and during that time the 
claimant, his predecessors or grantors, must have paid all taxes 
levied and assessed upon the land according to law." Id. Because 
a party claiming a prescriptive easement (a) does not "hold" the 
land adversely by protecting the land by a substantial inclosure 
or by cultivating the land, and (b) does not pay taxes on the land, 
the Court concluded that "[t]his statute does not apply to rights-
of-way or any other class of easement by prescription." See id. 
Thus, a party claiming a prescriptive easement cannot obtain such 
an easement after the 7-year period for adverse possession has 
passed. The territorial court's statement in Harkness has nothing 
to do with whether the 7-year statute of limitations under Utah's 
2The statutory provisions quoted by the Court in 1891 were 
very similar to those in the present Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7, -10 
and -12. 
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adverse possession statute applies to extinguishment of an easement 
by adverse possession. 
The district court in the present case, therefore, erroneously 
applied the above statement in Harkness to this case and incorrect-
ly concluded that the 20-year common law period for a prescriptive 
easement governs a statutory claim of adverse possession of an 
easement. In reaching these highly unusual conclusions, the dist-
rict court ignored the express language of Section 78-12-8 which 
makes it clear that " [w]henever it appears that the occupant . . . 
entered into possession of the property under a claim of title, . . 
and there has been a continued occupation and possession of the 
property . . . for 7 years, the property so included is deemed to 
ave been held adversely. ..." The statute is specific and plain. 
It expressly permits extinguishment of any "other right" after 
7 years of adverse possession. Plaintiff's claimed easement is 
such a right. Thus, that easement, to the extent it ever existed, 
has been extinguished by adverse possession, and the district 
court's judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor of 
defendant. 
B. The Trial Court Erred In Granting Plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, Even If The 20-Year Statute of Limita-
tions Were Applied To A Claim Of Adverse Possession, 
Because Over 30 Years' Adverse Use Occurred Or, At The 
Very Least, Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Con-
cerning Whether Adverse Use Continued For Over 30 Years. 
The undisputed facts in the present case show conclusively 
that the adverse use of plaintiff's claimed easement by the Nortons 
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and then by defendant was continuous for a period of over 30 years. 
(See R 215-219, 11 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23 and 24.) As 
stated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-9(1) through (3), adverse pos-
session exists when the land "has been usually cultivated or im-
proved, " where "it has been protected by a substantial inclosure," 
or where "it has been used for . . . the purpose of husbandry or for 
pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant." It is undis-
puted that Defendant's Property was used adversely and continuously 
for each of those statutory purposes for the 30-year period com-
mencing in the mid-1960s through the time of the filing of plain-
tiff's Complaint in this action in 1997. (See id.)3 
In Johnson v. Bellf 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), this Court held 
that the conduct of plaintiffs' predecessors in grazing cattle on 
their property, fencing a part of the property, repairing fences, 
plowing a part of the property, and paying taxes on the property 
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of title by adverse 
possession. Id. at 311-12. The undisputed facts in the present 
3Defendant did not "agree," contrary to what the district 
court stated, that the confrontation in 1982 between Mr. Norton and 
Mrs. Mower, or the "moment of truth," was the event that "started 
the clock to run." (See R 84-86, 98-100, 204-206.) Defendant 
contended, in light of plaintiff's own admission, that the clock, 
at the very least, started to run in 1982. The 15-year period 
between that time and the time of filing plaintiff's Complaint in 
1997, therefore, demonstrated conclusively that the 7-year period 
under Utah's adverse possession statute had run. (R Id.) Defen-
dant also contended that adverse possession had been continuous 
for a period of over 30 years--from the mid-1960s when the Nortons 
acquired Defendant's Property until the present time. (R Id.) 
Defendant took the position that the 30-year period far exceeded 
even the 20-year statute of limitations the district court held was 
applicable to defendant's claim of adverse possession. (R Id.) 
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case are even more compelling than those in Johnson and satisfy 
each of the statutory elements of adverse possession. Those facts 
show, even if the requirement of a 20-year period of adverse use 
were applied, the Nortons' and defendant's adverse use satisfied 
that requirement. Adverse use continued for over 30 continuous 
years (from the mid-1960s until the present time), as shown by the 
following undisputed facts: 
1. The claimed easement was continuously blocked off by 
a fence when the Nortons owned Defendant's Property, and by a 
gate when defendant owned the property. (R 213-219, HI 4, 10, 
13, 14, 19, 23 and 24.) 
2. Neither the Nortons nor defendant permitted any 
other person to use Defendant's Property for any purpose, 
including access to Plaintiff's Property. (R 216-219, H 13, 
14, 15, 16, 22, 23 and 25.) 
3. The Nortons kept horses or cattle on Defendant's 
Property nearly 100% of the time during the entire period 
they owned the property. They fenced the property to contain 
the animals and continuously occupied Defendant's Property in 
its entirety for their own use. (R 215-218, 1H 9, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 18 and 19.) 
4. The Nortons also continuously maintained a fence 
along the entire northern portion of their property. They 
pulled a portion of that fence open only once or twice a 
year to permit their farm animals to leave or enter the 
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property through the temporary opening in the fence. (R 216, 
1 14.) 
5. The Nortons plowed the entire property and planted 
grass. The plowed area included the portion plaintiff now 
claims as an easement. (R 216-218, 11 13, 18 and 19.) 
6. When defendant purchased Defendant's Property in 
1992, she continuously and exclusively used the property for 
the pasture of animals in connection with family farming 
operations. The property was enclosed at all times by a wire 
and wood post fence which was capable of containing livestock, 
and the fence ran along the entire south side of the county 
road adjacent to her property. She did not permit anyone 
else to use any portion of her property. (R 218, 1 23.) 
7. Defendant and the Nortons never let any third 
parties use Defendant's Property. (R 216-219, 11 13, 14, 15, 
19, 23, 25.) When a lady identified as Mrs. Mower entered 
Defendant's Property in the early 1980s, Mr. Norton informed 
her that she had no right to trespass on the property. When 
she claimed she needed to use the Norton property to gain 
access to Plaintiff's Property, Mr. Norton informed her that 
she had no right to do so and that if she disagreed, she would 
need to obtain a court order. Mr. Norton then put a lock on 
the end of the fence where he had opened the fence to let his 
animals in and out of Defendant's Property. "No Trespassing" 
signs located on the fence along the north boundary of Defen-
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dant's Property and installed by Mr. Norton prior to his 
encounter with Mrs. Mower, also made it clear that no one 
could enter Defendant's Property. (R 213, 1 4.) 
Thus, from the mid-1960s through at least July 31, 1997, when 
plaintiff filed his Complaint in the present action, such statutory 
adverse possession of the claimed easement by the Nortons, and 
subsequently by defendant, extinguished the right, if any ever 
existed, to use the easement which plaintiff claims. Such pos-
session, "exclusive of other right" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8, 
adversely possessed the claimed easement as a matter of law. Be-
cause the district court improperly granted summary judgment in 
plaintiff's favor, that judgment should be reversed and judgment 
should be entered in defendant's favor declaring that the claimed 
easement has been adversely possessed and does not exist. 
To the extent plaintiff claims he presented any facts to the 
contrary, then, and only then, there would be disputed issues of 
material fact as to whether the Nortons' and defendant's adverse 
use continued for at least 20 years. It was error for the district 
court, in either event, to ignore defendant's facts presented by 
affidavit and to grant summary judgment, concluding that the 
adverse possession did not continue for 20 years. The district 
court's judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor 
of defendant. At the very least, the judgment must be reversed 
so that any factual disputes can be resolved at trial. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred In Granting Plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment Because Genuine Issues Of Material Fact 
Exist Concerning Whether Plaintiff's Claimed Easement Had 
Been Abandoned. 
In Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 
(Utah 1977), this Court stated: ff[i]t is well recognized that an 
easement or right of way may be abandoned." See also Dahnken v. 
George Romney & Sons Co., 184 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1947) . Although 
defendant has been unable to locate any Utah appellate court deci-
sions concerning abandonment of an easement by necessity, the Court 
in Treseder stated that a right gained by conveyance "may not be 
lost by non-use alone and that an actual intent to abandon be 
evident." 567 P.2d at 182. An easement by necessity should have 
no greater standing than an easement acquired by conveyance, and 
would equally be subject to the law of abandonment. 
Jurisdictions recognizing that an easement by necessity may 
be abandoned have concluded that abandonment "will be found where 
there is manifested a clear intent, expressed or through acts of 
relinquishment, to abandon." See, e.g., Pencader Assoc, Inc. v. 
Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 1982). According to the 
Court in Pencader, 
' [n] o particular conduct is required, but the . . .conduct 
[by the grantee] must be inconsistent with one's right to 
use and enjoy the easement,7 such as: (1) the mainten-
ance of locked gates across the way; (2) the building of 
fences blocking the way; or (3) the erection of buildings 
blocking the way. 
Id.; see also Stozenski v. Borough of Forty-Fort, Luzerne County. 
317 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. 1974). 
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In addition, courts have found that evidence of an easement 
holder's non-use of an easement and acquiescence to the servient 
property owner's obstruction of an easement for a long period of 
time will justify a finding of abandonment. In Comeau v. Manzelli, 
182 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 1962), for example, the Court ruled that a 
finding of abandonment of an easement was warranted where the old 
right-of-way had been closed for over 20 years and had been ob-
structed by a fence with no gate, and trees had been planted in 
the easement area. Id. at 491. 
Similarly, in Sindlar v. William M. Bailey Co., 204 N.E.2d 
717 (Mass. 1965), the evidence showed that for over 35 years the 
easement holder permitted an adjoining landowner to use the ease-
ment area in a manner inconsistent with its use as a way, includ-
ing the erection of fences to enclose the way. Jd. at 720. That 
evidence established the easement holder's intent to abandon its 
rights to the private road and not to make further use of it. In 
addition to the easement claimant's non-use, the court pointed to 
the claimant's acquiescence to the adverse use of the area by the 
adjoining landowner as evidence warranting the conclusion that the 
easement had been abandoned. Id. at 720. The court observed that 
the claimant and its predecessors had stood by while the servient 
landowner had confined the area claimed for the easement to its own 
use during the 35-year period and had acquiesced in the relatively 
permanent changes, including the landowner's construction of a high 
chain-link fence which enclosed the disputed area and in the sub-
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sequent placing of a chain across the entrance to the area to pre-
vent persons other than the defendant's invitees from using that 
portion of the land. Id. at 720. 
Also, in Albanese v. Dominianni, 118 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1953), the court concluded that the easement claimant had 
abandoned a driveway easement due to non-use of the easement for 
more than 2 0 years and acquiescence in the construction of curbing, 
a metal fence, a garden and encroachments prohibiting use of the 
easement. 
The case of Canadian Nat. Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me. 
1992), also recognized that non-use coupled with an act or omission 
inconsistent with the claimed easement may result in abandonment 
of the easement. According to the Court, 
[t]o prove abandonment, a party must show (1) a history 
of nonuse coupled with an act or omission evincing a 
clear intent to abandon, or (2) adverse possession by 
the servient estate. 
Id. at 1179. In Sprague. the easement claimant's non-use was for 
a period of 40 years. 
The undisputed facts in the present case show a similar 
history of non-use by plaintiff coupled with acts and omissions 
evincing a clear intent on the part of plaintiff to abandon his 
claimed easement, as well as adverse possession by defendant and 
her predecessors, the Nortons. (See supra at 10-18.) Those facts 
are summarized as follows: 
1. Plaintiff acknowledged in correspondence that the 
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old, dilapidated house on his property had been "abandoned." 
(R 214-215, 1 8.) 
2. The occupants of Plaintiff's Property, the Ander-
sons, moved from that property in the late 1930s or early 
1940s, leaving the home to deteriorate to the point that 
animals began to inhabit it for several decades. (R 214-217, 
UH 7, 8 & 17.) 
3. From the late 1930s or early 1940s, no one lived in 
the old home, no one used Plaintiff's Property or the easement 
claimed by plaintiff, nor did anyone occupy Plaintiff's Prop-
erty, maintain the house or property, or seek to use the ease-
ment claimed by plaintiff to access Plaintiff's Property until 
plaintiff attempted to do so in connection with the present 
action. (R 214, 217, 11 7 & 17.) 
4. From at least the mid-1960s until the present time, 
the portion of Defendant's Property claimed as an easement 
by plaintiff was fenced off and subsequently blocked by a 
locked gate. (R 216-219, 11 13, 19 & 24.) The Nortons and 
defendant never let anyone use that portion of their prop-
erty for access to the old house or for any other purpose. 
(R 217-219, 11 15, 23 & 25.) 
5. From at least the mid-1960s, when the Nortons ac-
quired Defendant's Property, until the present time, a huge 
rock pile has existed on the south side of the dilapidated 
house on Plaintiff's Property. It consists of hundreds of 
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tons of boulders that could only be removed at a very sub-
stantial cost, and it covers a very large portion of Plain-
tiff's Property, making that portion of the property unusable. 
(R 214-215, 1 8.) 
6. Plaintiff and his predecessors stood by for over 30 
years, from at least the mid-1960s until plaintiff filed the 
present action, and acquiesced in defendant's and her prede-
cessors' blocking of the claimed easement by constructing a 
fence, placing "No Trespassing" signs on the fence, plowing 
and planting grass within the claimed easement area, and 
grazing animals within that area. (See R 215-219, 11 9, 12, 
13, 15, 18, 19, 23 & 25.) 
7. When the Nortons purchased Defendant's Property, 
it was obvious that Plaintiff's Property had long since been 
abandoned. (R 217, 1 17.) Not only was the old house dilap-
idated, but there was no evidence in the 1960s of an easement 
or lane across the eastern portion of Defendant's Property to 
the old house. (R 215-216, 11 11 & 12.) 
The above undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff's Prop-
erty was abandoned when the Andersons moved away from the property 
in the late 1930s or early 1940s. They show not only non-use of 
the property since that time, but conduct by plaintiff and his 
predecessors that is plainly inconsistent with any intention 
to make further use of the property for nearly half a century. 
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Only at the time when a lady identified as Mrs. Mower approached 
Mr. Norton in the early 1980s did anyone even manifest an inten-
tion to cross Defendant's Property to get to the old house. Even 
then, there is no evidence that Mrs. Mower claimed an easement 
across the east edge of Defendant's Property. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff 
and his predecessors did not abandon the property. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment against defendant 
should be reversed in its entirety and judgment should enter in 
defendant's favor, establishing that plaintiff's claimed easement 
was extinguished by adverse possession. In the alternative, the 
Court should vacate the judgment against defendant and order that 
all fact issues relating to adverse possession and abandonment 
be tried. 
Respectfully submitted this "2- day of May, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Er~r^tki / 
Rex E. Madsen 
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant 
H:\W0RK\RLM\11368\41\APPBAL\INITIAL.BRF 
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 7^ day of May, 2002, a 
true and correct copy of the above document was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Mr. Douglas B. Thayer 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Rex E. Madsen 
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant 
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78-12-7 JUDICIAL CODE 556 
of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the 
person prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or 
counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or 
defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor 
or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the 
property in question within seven years before the committing 
of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or 
defense or counterclaim made. 1953 
78-12-7. A d v e r s e possess ion — Possess ion presumed in 
owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the 
possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the 
property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof 
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears 
that the property has been held and possessed adversely to 
such legal title for seven years before the commencement of 
the action. 1953 
78-12-7.1. Adverse possess ion — Presumpt ion — Pro-
viso — Tax title. 
In every action for the recovery or possession of real prop-
erty or to quiet title to or determine the owner thereof the 
person establishing a legal title to such property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time 
required by law; and the occupation of such property by any 
other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such 
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of such action. 
Provided, however, that if in any action any party shall 
establish prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any real 
property under a tax title held by him and his predecessors for 
four years prior to the commencement of such action and one 
year after the effective date of this amendment he shall be 
presumed to be the owner of such property by adverse posses-
sion unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of 
such property under such title or that such tax title owner and 
his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or 
assessed upon such property within such four-year period. 
1953 
78-12-8. U n d e r written instrument or judg m ent . 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under 
whom he claims, entered into possession of the property under 
claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim 
upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the 
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a 
competent court, and that there has been a continued occupa-
tion and possession of the property included in such instru-
ment, decree or judgment, or of some part of the property 
under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is 
deemed to have been held adversely, except tha t when the 
property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the 
possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other 
lot of the same tract. 1953 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under 
writ ten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by 
any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument 
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been pos-
sessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclo-
sure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for 
the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of 
husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the 
occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly 
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have 
been left not cleared or not inclosed according to the usual 
course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to 
have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 1953 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on writ ten instru-
ment or judgment . 
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued 
occupation of land under claim of title, exclusive of any other 
right, but not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or 
decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed 
to have been held adversely. 1953 
78-12-11. What const i tutes adverse possess ion not un-
der wri t ten instrument . 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a 
person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, 
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed 
and occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclo-
sure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon 
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for 
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the sum 
of $5 per acre. 1953 
78-12-12. Possess ion must be cont inuous , and taxes 
paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered estab-
lished under the provisions of any section of this code, unless 
it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed 
for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, 
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
1953 
78-12-12.1. P o s s e s s i o n and payment of t axe s — Prov iso 
— Tax tit le. 
In no case shall adverse possession be established under the 
provisions of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and grant-
ors have paid all the taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however, 
that payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his 
predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon such 
real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under 
which he claims for a period of not less than four years and for 
not less than one year after the effective date of this amend-
ment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this 
section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to estab-
lish adverse possession. 1953 
78-12-13. Adverse possess ion of public s treets or w a y s . 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or 
to any lands held by any town, city or county, or the corporate 
authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, 
avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other 
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such 
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have 
sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to 
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more 
than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the pur-
chaser, his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the 
exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real 
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. 1953 
c. A 
WADE S. WINEGAR #5561 
CHRISTOPHER S. CRUMP # 7839 
BRUCE R. MURDOCK #6948 
150 East 400 North 
Salem, Utah 84653 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Telephone (801) 423-2800 
Facsimile (801) 423-7210 
91 -Mlr'iP2s^^ z« 
;>,->. ' ' . K ; h ; . . . 
0/-ti>i 
BY BY 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLORIA MARTINEAU 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Judge Kay L.McIff 
Civil No. 970600181 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff was represented by Wade S. 
Winegar, Christopher S. Crump and Bruce R. Murdock and Defendant was represented by Rex 
E. Madsen. Oral argument was heard on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on April 19, 
2000, subsequent to which the Court requested supplemental memoranda from the parties. After 
having reviewed the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the parties' motions, together 
with the affidavits, exhibits and all other relevant documents on file with the Court, the Court 
makes the following ORDER: 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The plaintiff Mower owns a one acre parcel of land in Sanpete County surrounded 
on three sides by the property of the defendant Martineau. The Mower and Martineau properties 
have a common origin of title. Mower's one acre parcel is adjoined on a fourth side by the 
property of Dorothy C. Minor. Minor's property has a different origin of title. There are no 
overlaps in the chain of title for the Minor property and the chain of title for the Mower and 
Martineau properties. 
There is an old home and farm buildings located on Mower's one acre. Mower's 
occupancy dates to 1902 though the home has not been occupied for a half century or so. There 
is a county road along the north side of the Martineau property. When the Mower home was 
occupied or the one acre was otherwise utilized it had access to the county road across the 
Martineau property.1 (See Exhibit "A" reflecting the location of properties and roads.) 
During the long period of non-use by Mowers, Martineau and her predecessors 
cultivated the area covered by the old access road and treated it as part of the adjoining field. 
Sometime in 1982, members of the Mower family sought to cross the Martineau property to 
access the one acre but were confronted by the then owner, one Norton, who refused to allow the 
crossing unless a court order was obtained. This refusal and/or interruption prompted the filing 
of the within lawsuit in July of 1997. 
1
 Martineau initially denied this, but her admissions during discovery establish otherwise. 
2 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Easement by Necessity 
Mower has laid a solid foundation for establishment of an easement by necessity. 
"An easement by necessity arises 'when there is a conveyance of part of a tract of land which is 
so situated that either the part conveyed or the part retained is surrounded with no access to a 
road to the outer world'." Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976)). 
It is clear from the undisputed facts that there was a unity of title followed by 
severance and that the easement to access the Mower parcel was reasonably necessary to the 
enjoyment of that property. Mower's predecessors owned all of the property. The severance 
occurred in 1902. There was no unity of title involving the Minor property (adjoining Mower on 
the fourth side) and accordingly no easement by necessity could have arisen across the Minor 
property. 
B. Abandonment 
Some jurisdictions seem to reject the notion that a way of necessity can be 
extinguished by abandonment. The underlying notion is that the easement arises by necessity 
and must continue so long as the necessity exists. See, e.g. Berkley Development Corp. v. 
Huntzler, 229 S.E.2d 732 (W.Va. 1976). Other jurisdictions, apparently the more common, 
recognize the possibility of extinguishment by abandonment but such is not created solely by 
non-use. The majority of jurisdictions appear to require that the non-use be accompanied by 
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some affirmative manifestation evidencing clear intent to abandon. See, e.g., Conner v. Lucas, 
By and Through Lucas, 920 P.2d 171 (Or. App. 1996) and other cases cited in footnote 4 of 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Utah does not appear to have faced the issue but this court is persuaded that when 
and if it does it will require evidence of an actual intent to abandon and will not imply the same 
solely from non-use. Moreover, it is not unlikely that it will require clear and convincing 
evidence of an intent to abandon. That conclusion is premised on the nature of an easement by 
necessity. It arises because without it the severed land becomes essentially useless.2 Property 
rights have uniformly received highly favorable treatment by Utah courts and great caution 
should be taken to avoid rendering a parcel valueless. 
In this court's view, abandonment and prescription are not synonymous. Use or 
non-use in the face of challenge are the subject matter of prescriptive rights. Defendant's claim 
of loss by prescription is treated hereafter. Defendant's claim of abandonment relies solely upon 
evidence of non-use. She offers nothing evidencing an affirmative manifestation of intent to 
abandon on Mower's part. Accordingly, she fails to create a triable issue of fact on this point. 
2
 In an affidavit support Defendant Martineau's position, her predecessor, Norton, 
expresses a belief that plaintiff wants to create enough of a nuisance that defendants would buy 
the one acre parcel just to be rid of the problem. He indicates this would create "an atmosphere 
of supposed coercion." There is a reverse side to this. If defendant can completely land-lock 
plaintiff, then the defendant becomes the sole and only potential buyer. Plaintiffs bargaining 
strength would be reduced to virtually nil. 
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C. Adverse Possession 
Martineau seeks summary judgment under a theory of adverse possession. She 
relies specifically on Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8 and 12. These sections require continuous 
occupancy and payment of real property taxes for a period of seven years. These sections relate 
to acquisition of the basic fee title and have not been relied on by Utah courts in relation to 
prescriptive easements. The early Utah case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 1 Utah 227 (Utah 
1891) flatly states: "This statute [Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8 and 12] does not apply to rights of 
way or any other class of easement by prescription." The seven year adverse possession period 
cannot be relied upon to create a prescriptive easement, Id., nor can it be relied upon to 
extinguish it. As noted in the Harkness decision, the twenty year requirement for a prescriptive 
easement had its origin in eighteenth century English common law. It is simply a different kind 
of creature than the adverse possession statutory scheme. Defendant appears to have taken her 
cue in this case from an improvident and unsupportable acknowledgment by plaintiff in his 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment. In 
footnote 5, page 11, plaintiff states, 
However, Utah generally recognizes that easements can be lost through adverse 
possession. See Coleman Co. v. Southwest Field Irrigation Co., 584P.2d 883 
(Utah 1978 and Riverside Country Club v. Ashton, 506 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1973). 
This court does not consider either of the cited cases as supporting plaintiffs 
statement. In Riverside, the older of the two cases, the appellant raised three arguments. Each 
was summarily rejected without analysis. One argument was that a claimed easement had been 
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destroyed by adverse possession. The court concluded that this "was not shown by satisfactory 
evidence." The opinion is abbreviated, contains no analysis and cites no legal authority. The 
reference to extinguishment of an easement by adverse possession rises only to the level of a 
summarily rejected claim. The same is essentially true of the Coleman case cited by plaintiff. 
The whole of the discussion in Coleman is as follows: "The trial court correctly observed that 
plaintiff acquired no right by adverse possession simply be relocating the easement, and in any 
event, it was not an adverse act at all because it was acquiesced in by Old Fort." Coleman at 
884. [Emphasis by the Court.] 
These cases provide no authority for the proposition that the statutory doctrine of 
adverse possession should be applied to prescriptive easements. The overlap is limited to the 
concept of adversity, though sometimes insufficient care is employed when the terms are used by 
courts. 
D. Loss by Prescription 
If the owner of the servient estate uses his land in a manner which is adverse to 
the interests of the owner of the easement for a period of twenty years, the time required for the 
acquisition of prescriptive rights, the easement may be subject to termination. (Restatement of 
property, § 506.) The undisputed evidence before this court is that the moment of truth did not 
arise between these parties until 1982 when plaintiff sought access and defendant's predecessor 
flatly denied the same absent a court order. That is "adversity". Both sides have agreed that this 
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started the clock to run, but Martineau seeks to apply the seven year period under the statutory 
adverse possession law. It has no application. The required period is twenty years. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has established an easement by necessity. Defendant has failed to offer 
any evidence of an affirmative manifestation of intent to abandon. There is no triable issue on 
this point. Defendant has established prevention of use of the easement between 1982 and the 
filing of this action in 1997, a period of fifteen years. The statutory adverse possession scheme 
relying on possession and payment of taxes for seven years has no application. Creation as well 
as extinguishment of prescriptive rights requires twenty years. The facts do not comply with this 
requirement. Defendant's motion for summary judgment fails. Plaintiff is entitled to summary 
judgment reestablishing the old lane across the east edge of defendant's property running 
between the county road and the Mower property and limited to the width of historical use. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. That there are no triable issues of material fact, and therefore, as a matter of 
law, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor. Thus, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Mower is entitled to an easement over the east edge of the 
following described real property, limited to the width of historical use: 
7 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 24, 
Township 13 South, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence 
South 5.00 chains, thence East 4.60 chains, thence South 1.30 chains, thence East 
15.40 chains, thence North 6.30 chains, thence West 20.00 chains to the point of 
beginning, containing 12.0 acres. 
DATED this 
Approved as to Form 
District CourfrTSanpete County. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rex E. Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3jr3ay of August, 2001,1 caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following by the method indicated 
below: 
Rex Madsen (^TtJS. POSTAGE PREPAID MAIL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU ( ) FACSIMILE 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor ( ) HAND DELIVERED 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 ( ) FEDERAL EXPRESS 
QAAAAJitL ^nrJLH&J 
Annette Fields 
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